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Abstract
Electricity markets employ different congestion management methods to handle the
limited transmission capacity of the power system. This paper compares production
efficiency and other aspects of nodal and zonal pricing. We consider two types of zonal
pricing: zonal pricing with Available Transmission Capacity (ATC) and zonal pricing
with Flow-Based Market Coupling (FBMC). We develop a mathematical model to study
the imperfect competition under zonal pricing with FBMC. Zonal pricing with FBMC is
employed in two stages, a day-ahead market stage and a re-dispatch stage. We show that
the optimality conditions and market clearing conditions can be reformulated as a mixed
integer linear program (MILP), which is straightforward to implement. Zonal pricing
with ATC and nodal pricing is used as our benchmarks. The imperfect competition
under zonal pricing with ATC and nodal pricing are also formulated as MILP models.
All MILP models are demonstrated on 6-node and the modified IEEE 24-node systems.
Our numerical results show that the zonal pricing with ATC results in large production
inefficiencies due to the inc-dec game. Improving the representation of the transmission
network as in the zonal pricing with FBMC mitigates the inc-dec game.
Keywords: Congestion management, Zonal pricing, Flow-based market coupling
JEL Classification: C61, C72, D43, L13, L94
1. Introduction
Electricity markets around the world mainly use two congestion management meth-
ods: (a) nodal pricing and (b) zonal pricing. Electricity markets in the US and New
Zealand employ nodal pricing. In contrast the European electricity markets favor zonal
pricing.
Nodal pricing considers all the transmission constraints in the day-ahead market.
Nodal prices could differ if congestion occurs in the transmission system. Each producer
Email addresses: sarfati@kth.se (Mahir Sarfati), mrhesamzadeh@ee.kth.se
(Mohammad Reza Hesamzadeh), par.holmberg@ifn.se (Pa¨r Holmberg)
Preprint submitted to Energy Strategy Reviews February 14, 2019
is paid in accordance with the local price at the node where it is located. The nodal
market is cleared in a single stage. Currently, nodal pricing is not an option for the
integrated European electricity market [1]. One reason is that switching to the nodal
pricing would require a fundamental change in the way European electricity markets
are structured (i.e. current arrangements for cross-border trading would need to be
redeveloped, implying significant IT and procedural changes) and the cost impact of
this would, in the short-term, likely out weight the benefits [2].
Instead, the European Union (EU) favors zonal pricing. Zonal pricing aggregates
nodes into zones with uniform prices. Ideally, zonal pricing should consider all trans-
mission constraints and the nodal prices inside a zone should be the same [3], [4], [5]
and [6]. In practice, a simplified transmission network is taken into account. Ac-
cording to the representation of the transmission constraints, there are two different
versions of zonal pricing that are considered by EU: (i) Zonal pricing with Available
Transmission Capacity (ATC) and (ii) Zonal pricing with Flow-Based Market Coupling
(FBMC). Zonal pricing with ATC is for example employed in the Nordic electricity mar-
ket. The previous design of the Central Western European (CWE) market also used
zonal pricing with ATC. This method ignores the intra-zonal transmission constraints
in the day-ahead market and the power flow between two zones is only limited by a
pre-defined value (ATC). Since the transmission constraints are ignored for intra-zonal
flows and approximated for the inter-zonal flows, the day-ahead dispatch may overload
some transmission lines. These lines need to be relieved in the re-dispatch stage. In
this second stage, all transmission constraints are taken into account and the overloaded
lines are relieved. The re-dispatch generates net-expenses, which are paid by the system
operator.
Some of the European markets are changing their day-ahead market to flow-based
zonal markets, ”Flow-based Market Coupling” (FBMC) [7]. FBMC considers con-
straints on a set of representative transmission lines, the Critical Branches (CBs) in
the day-ahead market stage. Any transmission line (no matter if it is an inter-zonal or
intra-zonal line) which has a strong impact on the cross-border trades can be selected
as a CB. Hence, zonal pricing with FBMC is a better representation of transmission
constraints than zonal pricing with ATC. However, overloadings may still occur in the
transmission network since the CBs are decided before the clearing of the day-ahead
market. Hence, a re-dispatch stage is still needed in zonal pricing with FBMC.
We consider a market-based re-dispatch1 with countertrading as in UK and the
Nordic countries. A general problem in this case is that different representations of
the transmission constraints in the two stages result in predictable price difference, so
that producers can make an arbitrage profit. In references [10], [11], [12] and [13] show
that export constrained producers can make an arbitrage profit by overselling power in
the day-ahead market and buying back power at a lower price in the re-dispatch stage.
This type of bidding behavior is called the ”increase-decrease game (inc-dec game)” [12],
1Some electricity markets, i.e. Germany, uses a regulated re-dispatch mechanism where the producers
are paid according to their true costs [8, 9].
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[13] and [14] or ”decrease game (dec game)” [15] and [16]. The inc-dec game was for
example observed during the electricity crisis in California [16], [17] and [18] and in the
British electricity market [19]. Several researchers analyze the inc-dec game in markets
with zonal pricing and ATC. Authors in [12] consider a competitive market and analyze
the imperfections caused by arbitrage opportunities. The study in [20] considers both
imperfect competition and arbitrage opportunities but their analysis is limited to two-
node networks. Authors in [13] model a two-stage price-bid game to evaluate designs
of zonal power market with imperfect competition.
One of the purposes of employing zonal pricing with FBMC is to reduce the inc-dec
game opportunities [14]. Before the CWE market employed zonal pricing with FBMC,
this method and zonal pricing with ATC were run in parallel for 18 months. It was
reported that FBMC lead to a significant increase in social welfare and improved price
convergence [21]. Author in [22] simulated both zonal pricing methods, using 12-month
data from the CWE market, and finds that FBMC improves social welfare by between
e50M and e100M. The studies in [23] and [24] confirm these findings. However, these
studies ignore distortions due to imperfect competition. In particular, the impact of
changes in the market design and in the arbitrage opportunities on the bidding behavior
of producers were not taken into account by studies in [21], [22], [23] and [24]. To the
best of our knowledge, this paper is first to study the inc-dec game in markets with
zonal pricing and FBMC. In addition we consider imperfect competition.
This paper develops a mathematical model to analyze imperfect competition and
the inc-dec game in markets with zonal pricing with FBMC. We consider two stages,
a day-ahead market stage and a re-dispatch stage. The imperfect competition of pro-
ducers in these two-stages is modeled as a two-stage game. The two-stage game is
formulated as a two-stage EPEC which is further reformulated as a two-stage MILP.
Our market-clearing model in the day-ahead stage is related to [24], but they assume
perfect competition.
Zonal pricing with ATC and nodal pricing are used as benchmarks in this study.
For zonal pricing with ATC, we consider a similar two-stage zonal model as in [13] and
[25]. But, in [13] and [25], the imbalance uncertainties are also taken into account.
Hence, the second stage of the market is used both for balancing the imbalances and for
relieving the overloaded lines (re-dispatching). In this study, we assume that there is no
uncertainty in the market. Accordingly, the second stage in our zonal pricing with ATC
model is only used for re-dispatching. We formulated the two-stage game under zonal
pricing with ATC as a two-stage MILP model. For nodal pricing, a one-stage game is
considered to model the imperfect competition. The one-stage game is formulated as
a one-stage MILP model. Our one-stage MILP model is related to [26], [27], [28] and
[29]. Based on our three MILP models, we analyze the imperfect competition and the
inc-dec game for each congestion management method and we compare the production
efficiencies and other aspects of nodal and zonal pricing. The study in [13] analyzes the
two-stage zonal markets with ATC using a two-stage EPEC. However, it reformulates
the two-stage EPEC as a Mixed Integer Bilinear Program.
We solve for Nash equilibria (NE) in the one-stage game. Strategies are assumed to
be sequentially rational in the two-stage game, so in that game we solve for Subgame
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Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE). There are multiple equilibria, and we solve for the worst
equilibrium, which has the highest total dispatch cost. The developed MILP models
are demonstrated in 6-node and the modified IEEE 24-node systems. Our numerical
results show that the zonal pricing with ATC has 10.5-18.7% higher total production
cost as compared to the nodal pricing. This is due to the inc-dec game. Changing the
zonal design to the zonal pricing with FBMC does not avoid the inc-dec game but it
improves market efficiency by 8.6-14.9% as compared to the zonal pricing with ATC.
We investigate the impact of ramping costs on the market efficiency and we see that
it has substantial impact on the market efficiency. In one of our examples, without
ramping costs, zonal pricing with FBMC is as efficient as nodal pricing.
The main contribution of this paper is twofold: (i) We develop a MILP model which
formulates the two-stage bidding game of multiple producers in zonal markets with
FBMC. (ii) Using this MILP model, we compute production inefficiencies and other
aspects of the design which we compare with the benchmarks, nodal pricing and zonal
pricing with ATC.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the three congestion
management methods. Sections 3, 4 and 5 derive the MILP problems which model the
imperfect competition for nodal pricing, zonal pricing with ATC and zonal pricing with
FBMC, respectively. Section 6 presents the simulation results of the 6-node and the
modified IEEE 24-node example systems. Section 7 closes the paper.
2. Congestion Management Methods
In this study, we develop mathematical models to analyze imperfect competition
between producers for three congestion management methods: Nodal pricing, Zonal
pricing with Available Transmission Capacity (ATC) and Zonal pricing with Flow-Based
Market Coupling (FBMC). Table 1 illustrates the considered transmission constraints
and the auction format of each congestion management method. We do not have any
uncertainty in the model. Hence, all trade in the second-stage is countertrading, which
the market operator uses to relieve congestion. As in practice, we assume that marginal
pricing is used in the day-ahead market. Similar to the Nordic countries and UK, we
assume re-dispatches are paid as bid.
Table 1: Considered transmission constraints and auction format of each congestion management
method
Considered transmission
Auction format
constraints
Nodal pricing All transmission constraints Marginal pricing
Zonal pricing stage 1 only inter-zonal constraints Marginal pricing
with ATC stage 2 All transmission constraints Pay-as-bid
Zonal pricing stage 1 only critical branches Marginal pricing
with FBMC stage 2 All transmission constraints Pay-as-bid
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We consider a transmission network where nodes n = 1, ...,N are connected by
transmission lines k = 1, ...,K with transmission capacities Fk (MW). There is a fixed
demand Dn (MWh) at each node. There are multiple producers u = 1, ...,U with
production capacities Gu which are located in some of the nodes in the network.
We assume there is no uncertainty in our model. This deterministic setting is used
in our paper in order to simplify our model. Since our paper is one of the first papers
which studies the inc-dec game in zonal markets with FBMC, we focus on the model
without making it cloudy with increased complexity of uncertainty modeling. This
assumption is commonly used in the relevant literature as in [12], [26], [29] and [30].
However, the case of stochastic framework is a good extension of this work. We assume
that each producer makes one price bid per plant, which corresponds to the design in
Colombia. But most other markets would allow producers to make several bids for one
plant, so that the bid price would increase with the output of the plant. In practice,
producers choose bid prices from a discrete set. We also consider problems with a finite
set of permissible prices, but we approximate reality by considering a coarse price grid
with just a few allowed price levels. We assume that the market operator discloses
all relevant parameters, i.e. transmission network parameters, nodal demands, before
the day-ahead market stage. Moreover the marginal costs of producers are common
knowledge among producers. This assumption is a standard assumption in the relevant
literature as in [31], [32], [33], [34], [35] and [36].
The following three sections derive the mathematical models of imperfect compe-
tition for nodal pricing, zonal pricing with ATC and zonal pricing with FBMC. The
detailed list of symbols used in the mathematical models can be found in Appendix B.
3. Imperfect Competition under Nodal Pricing
Under nodal pricing all transmission constraints are considered in the day-ahead
market, and therefore there is no need for the re-dispatch stage. For this reason, a
market under nodal pricing can be modeled by a one-stage game. We mathematically
model this one-stage game using the same approach as in [26]. Fig. 1 illustrates the
derivation of the one-stage model.
We assume each generator has a finite set of biding strategies s = 1, ...,S. After all
generators submit their strategic price bids, cˆu ($/MWh), the market operator collects
the bids and decides the dispatch of each producer, gu (MWh), and the local market
price, λn ($/MWh), in each node.
The Nash equilibrium of the one-stage game is an outcome where no producer can in-
crease its profit, piu ($/h), by changing its bid unilaterally. This is modeled in inequality
(1).
piu(s
∗
u, s
∗
−u) ≥ piu(su, s∗−u) ∀u (1)
Inequality (1) ensures that for each producer the profit in the Nash equilibrium strat-
egy piu(s
∗
u, s
∗−u) is greater or equal than the profit in all alternative strategies piu(su, s∗−u)
while holding its rivals’ strategies fixed. We can formulate the profit of producer u as
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Minimize   Dispatch  
    cost
Subject to:
    Constraints 
    (3b)-(3d)
Maximize  Profit of producer 1
Subject to: 
 Constraints of producer 1 
Minimize   Dispatch  
    cost
Subject to:
    Constraints 
    (3b)-(3d)
Maximize  Profit of producer U
Subject to: 
 Constraints of producer U 
Nash equilibrium of one-stage game 
(3)
(6)
(9)
(6)
(3)
Figure 1: The derivation of one-stage game model under nodal pricing, mathematical formulations of
each box is stated in bold fonts in paranthesis
in (2).
piu = (
∑
u:n
λn − Cu)gu (2)
In (2), piu is the profit of producer u,
∑
u:n λn is the nodal price faced by producer
u which is located at node n and Cu is the marginal cost of producer u. The price
and dispatch in the nodal market are decided by an economic dispatch problem. It is
formulated in (3).
Minimize
gu
∑
u
cˆugu (3a)
Subject to:∑
u
gu =
∑
n
Dn : (ζ) (3b)
Fk −
∑
n
Hk,n(
∑
n:u
gu −Dn) ≥ 0 : (τk) ∀k (3c)
0 ≤ gu ≤ Gu : (ρu, θu) ∀u (3d)
Problem (3) is a linear program (LP). Objective function (3a) expresses the dispatch
cost. Constraint (3b) is the energy balance constraint. Constraints (3c) and (3d) repre-
sent both upper and lower limits of the transmission network and the generation limits,
respectively. In (3c), Hk,n is the nodal Power-Transfer-Distribution-Factors (PTDF).
Since Problem (3) is a linear program (LP), its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
are both necessary and sufficient. The stationary, dual feasibility and strong duality
conditions of (3) are derived in (4a), (4b) and (4c), respectively.
− cˆu + ζ −
∑
u:n
(
∑
k
Hk,nτk) + ρu − θu = 0, ∀u (4a)
τk, ρu, θu ≥ 0 (4b)
−
∑
u
cˆugu − (−ζ
∑
n
Dn +
∑
k
τk(Fk +
∑
n
Hk,n(
∑
n
Dn)) +
∑
u
θuGu) = 0 (4c)
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Nodal price is defined by the subtraction of the marginal cost of transmission con-
gestions from the marginal cost at the reference node [37]. The marginal cost at the
reference node is given by the Lagrange multiplier of energy balance constraint (3b),
ζ, and the marginal cost of transmission congestion for line k is given by the Lagrange
multiplier of transmission-network-limit constraint (3c), τk. Mathematically, the nodal
price faced by producer u located at node n is expressed by λu = (ζ−
∑
u:n
∑
kHk,nτk).
Using this expression and stationary condition (4a), it can be written as λu = cˆu−ρu+θu.
If we put this expression in (2), we have piu = (cˆu − Cu)gu − ρugu + θugu. The comple-
mentary slackness conditions of (3d) are ρugu = 0 and θu(Gu − gu) = 0. Using these
conditions, we can replace ρugu by 0 and θugu by θuGu in the profit expression. Finally
the profit function (2) is reformulated as in (5).
piu = (cˆu − Cu)gu + θuGu, ∀u (5)
Now we can formulate the strategic bidding model of a producer in the nodal power
market as in (6).
Maximize
gu,cˆu,ζ,τk,ρu,θu,piu
piu = (cˆu − Cu)gu + θuGu (6a)
Subject to:
Constraints (3b)− (3d), (4) (6b)
cˆu ∈ [Cu, Cu], ∀u (6c)
Objective function (6a) maximizes the profit of producer u while satisfying the KKT
conditions of (3) and the bid limits in (6c). In maximization problem (6), bilinear term
cˆugu appears in (4c) and (6a). We approximate the price bids cˆu in interval [Cu,Cu] by
a set of discrete values as in [29]. This approximation is modeled using binary variable
xu,a in (7). Parameter Ba is set in a way that the upper and lower limits and pre-defined
number of values in between can be considered.
cˆu =
∑
a
Baxu,aCu (7)
This approximation transforms the type of bilinearity in term cˆugu from the product
of two continuous variables to the product of a continuous and a binary variable. The
latter type of bilinearity can be linearized by McCormick reformulation [38]. We replace
cˆu by its definition in (7) and linearize bilinear term xu,agu. To do this, we first define a
new variable ϑu,a and replace bilinear term xu,agu by ϑu,a. Then we add the constraints
in (8) to the model in (6).
gu +Gu(xu,a − 1) ≤ ϑu,a ≤ gu (8a)
0 ≤ ϑu,a ≤ Guxu,a (8b)
After the linearization of xu,agu, the resulting model is a MILP model which repre-
sents the strategic bidding problem of a producer. Since each producer chooses its
bid from a discrete set, the set of its alternative strategies {cˆu(s1, s∗−u),cˆu(s2, s∗−u),
cˆu(sU , s∗−u)} can be formed by different combinations of binary variable xu,a. We can
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calculate each producer’s profit in all alternative strategies while holding its rivals’
strategies fixed. This enables us to replace the objective function of each producer’s
bidding problem by (1). This transforms the problem of each producer into a system of
mixed-integer linear constraints (MILCs). Solving all producers’ MILCs together gives
us the Nash equilibrium of the one-stage game.
Our model may have multiple Nash equilibria, to tackle this, we employ the worst
Nash equilibrium (WNE) concept where we search the Nash equilibrium which has the
worst (highest) dispatch cost [26] and [39]. The WNE problem is formulated in (9).
Maximize
Ψˆ
∑
u
cˆugu (9a)
Subject to:
Nash equilibrium constraint (1) (9b)
For Nash equilibrium strategy s∗u, ∀u :
{(3b)− (3d), (4), (5), (7), (8)} (9c)
For all alternative strategies (su, s
∗
−u), ∀u :
{(3b)− (3d), (4), (5), (7), (8)} (9d)
The set of decision variables in (9) is Ψˆ = Ψ ∪ Ψ(su, s∗−u) where Ψ ={gu, ζ, τk,
ρu, θu, piu, cˆu, xu,a, ϑu,a}. Constraints (9c) and (9d) are written for Nash equilibrium
strategy s∗u, and for all alternative strategies (su,s∗−u), respectively.
4. Imperfect Competition under Zonal Pricing with ATC
Zonal pricing with ATC has two stages. The first stage is the day-ahead market
stage and the second stage is the re-dispatch stage. All producers can trade power in
both stages. The considered market has zones z = 1, ...,Z which aggregates specific
nodes. The trade between neighboring zones l = l, ...,L is limited by the ATC value,
F¯l(MW ). Timing of the information exchanges between the market operator and the
producers under zonal pricing with ATC is illustrated in Fig. 2.
Before the first stage, the market operator decides the ATCs between zones and
announces them. In the first stage of the two-stage game, each producer considers the
given ATCs, the Nash equilibrium in the re-dispatch stage and its rivals’ (predicted)
day-ahead bids and decides its own day-ahead bid, cˆu ($/MWh). The market opera-
tor receives the day-ahead bids from all producers and clears the day-ahead market.
The day-ahead dispatch results, gu (MWh), and the zonal prices, δz ($/MWh), are
announced by the market operator. In the second stage, each producer considers the
day-ahead dispatch and its rivals’ (predicted) regulation bids and decides its up- and
down-regulation bid, cˆupu ($/MWh) and cˆdnu ($/MWh). The market operator decides
the dispatch of the up- and down-regulation, gupu (MWh) and gdnu (MWh), in order to
relieve the overloading induced by the day-ahead dispatch.
The two-stage game under zonal pricing with ATC is modeled in our previous paper
[25] where the imbalance uncertainties are modeled and studied. Accordingly, the second
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Stage 1:
Day-ahead 
market stage
Stage 2:
Re-dispatching 
stage
time
Market operator 
announces the 
ATCs between the 
zones
The market operator clears 
the day-ahead market and 
announces the day-ahead 
dispatch and zonal prices
The market operator dispatches 
the regulation bids to relieve 
the overloadings induced by the 
day-ahead dispatch
The producers 
submit their day-
ahead bids to the 
market operator
The producers 
submit their 
regulation bids to 
the market operator
Figure 2: Timing of information exchanges under zonal pricing with ATC
stage is cleared for supplying the imbalances and for re-dispatching. In this paper, we
assume that there is no uncertainty in the market. This simplifies our model since
the second stage of the market is only used for re-dispatching. Fig. 3 illustrates the
derivation of the two-stage game mathematical model. The SPNE in this two-stage
game can be found by backward induction. Thus we start to derive our mathematical
model with the last stage, the re-dispatch stage.
Minimize  Regulation cost in RS
Subject to: 
 Constraints(12b)-(12e)
Maximize  Profit of producer 1 in RS
Subject to: 
 Constraints of producer 1 in RS 
Nash equilibrium in RS
Minimize  Regulation cost in RS
Subject to: 
 Constraints(12b)-(12e)
Maximize  Profit of producer U in RS
Subject to: 
 Constraints of producer U in RS 
Minimize  Dispatch cost in DAMS
Subject to: 
 Constraints(19b)-(19d)
Maximize  Total profit of producer 1 in DAMS 
  and RS
Subject to: 
 Constraints of producer 1 in DAMS 
Nash equilibrium in RS
Minimize  Dispatch cost in DAMS
Subject to: 
 Constraints(19b)-(19d)
Maximize  Total profit of producer U in DAMS 
  and RS
Subject to: 
 Constraints of producer U in DAMS 
Nash equilibrium in RS
Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in two-stage game
(12)(14)
(16)
(12)(14)
(16)
(19)
(23)
(19)
(16)(23)
(25)
Figure 3: The derivation of two-stage game model under zonal pricing, mathematical formulations of
each box is stated in bold fonts in paranthesis, DAMS: Day-ahead market stage, RS: Re-dispatch stage
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4.1. Nash equilibrium in the re-dispatch stage
The Nash equilibrium in the re-dispatch stage is an outcome where no producer can
increase its profit in the re-dispatch stage, φu ($/h), by changing its bid unilaterally.
This is modeled in inequality (10).
φu(ω
∗
u, ω
∗
−u) ≥ φu(ωu, ω∗−u), ∀u (10)
In inequality (10), φu(ω
∗
u, ω
∗−u) and φu(ωu, ω∗−u) represents the profit in the re-
dispatch stage for Nash equilibrium strategy (ω∗u) and for alternative strategies (ωu)
while holding its rivals’ strategies fixed. In the re-dispatch stage, each producer is paid
according to its own price-bid. The profit of producer u in the re-dispatch stage is
formulated in (11).
φu = (cˆ
up
u − Cupu )gupu + (Cdnu − cˆdnu )gdnu (11)
The re-dispatch stage is used for relieving the overloading in the transmission sys-
tem induced by the day-ahead dispatch. The market operator dispatches the down-
regulation bids to reduce the injections from the export-constrained nodes and it dis-
patches the up-regulation bids to increase the injections from the import-constrained
nodes. The dispatch is decided by the solution of a bid-based economic dispatch prob-
lem. This bid-based economic dispatch problem is formulated in (12).
Minimize
gupu ,gdnu
∑
u
(cˆupu g
up
u − cˆdnu gdnu ) (12a)∑
u
gu + g
up
u − gdnu −
∑
n
Dn = 0 : (α) (12b)
Fk −
∑
n
Hk,n(
∑
n:u
gu + g
up
u − gdnu −Dn) ≥ 0 : (µk) ∀k (12c)
0 ≤ gupu ≤ Gu − gu : (κu, βu) ∀u (12d)
0 ≤ gdnu ≤ gu : (ψu, ϕu) ∀u (12e)
Objective function (12a) minimizes the total regulation net-expenses. The energy
balance constraint is represented in (12b). Constraint (12c) models both upper and
lower bounds of the transmission limits and u : n represents the connection of pro-
ducer u to node n. The regulation capacity constraints are represented in (12d) and
(12e). gu is the given dispatch level in the day-ahead market. The Lagrange multipli-
ers corresponding to the constraints are presented in parentheses following the related
constraint. Optimization model (12) is LP so its KKT conditions are both necessary
and sufficient. The stationary, dual feasibility and strong duality conditions of (12) are
derived in (13a)-(13b),(13c) and (13d), respectively.
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− cˆupu + α−
∑
u:n
(
∑
k
Hk,nµk) + κu − βu = 0, ∀u (13a)
cˆdnu − α+
∑
u:n
(
∑
k
Hk,nµk)− ψu − ϕu = 0, ∀u (13b)
µk, κu, βu, ψu, ϕu ≥ 0 (13c)∑
u
(−cˆupu gupu + cˆdnu gdnu )− (α(
∑
u
gu −
∑
n
Dn) +
∑
u
(βu(Gu − gu) + ϕugu)+∑
k
µk(Fk −
∑
n
Hk,n(
∑
n:u
gu −Dn)) = 0 (13d)
The strategic bidding model of a producer in the re-dispatch stage is formulated in
(14).
Maximize
Φ
φu = (cˆ
up
u − Cupu )gupu + (Cdnu − cˆdnu )gdnu (14a)
Subject to:
Constraints (12b)− (12e), (13) (14b)
cˆupu ∈ [Cupu , Cupu ], ∀u (14c)
cˆdnu ∈ [Cdnu , Cdnu ], ∀u (14d)
Objective function (11) maximizes the profit of producer u in the re-dispatch stage
while satisfying the KKT conditions of (12) and the regulation bid limits in (14c) and
(14d). The set of decision variables in (14) is Φ={gupu ,gdnu , α,µk, κu,βu,ψu,ϕu, cˆupu , cˆdnu }.
Maximization problem in (14) has two bilinear terms. These are (a) cˆupu g
up
u in (14a) and
(13d) and (b) cˆdnu g
dn
u in (14a) and (13d). We approximate the regulation bids cˆ
up
u and
cˆdnu in interval [C
up
u , C
up
u ] and [C
dn
u , C
dn
u ] by a set of discrete values. It is modeled by
binary variables xupu,a and xdnu,a in (15).
cˆupu =
∑
a
Bax
up
u,aC
up
u , cˆ
dn
u =
∑
a
Bax
dn
u,aC
dn
u (15)
After replacing cˆupu and cˆdnu by the expressions in (15), the type of the bilinearity in
terms cˆupu g
up
u and cˆdnu g
dn
u is transformed from the product of two continuous variables to
the product of a continuous variable and a binary variable. This type of bilinearity can
be linearized by McCormick reformulation as explained before.
After the linearization of the bilinear terms, the resulting model becomes a MILP.
Since each producer chooses its regulation bid from a discrete set, we can transform
each producer’s bidding problem into a MILC model as explained before. The solution
of all producers’ bidding problem simultaneously gives us the Nash equilibrium in the
re-dispatch stage. This is formulated by a feasibility problem in (16).
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Find Φˆ ∪ Φˆ(ωu, ω∗−u) (16a)
Such that
Nash equilibrium constraint (10) (16b)
For Nash equilibrium strategy ω∗u, ∀u :{
Constraints (11), (12b)− (12e), (13), (15) and linearization of xupu,agupu
and xdnu,ag
dn
u as in (8)
}
(16c)
For all alternative strategies (ωu, ω
∗
−u) ∀u :{
Constraints (11), (12b)− (12e), (13), (15) and linearization of xupu,agupu
and xdnu,ag
dn
u as in (8)
}
(16d)
Where in (16), Φˆ=Φ∪ {xupu,a,xdnu,a}. Constraints (16c) and (16d) are written for Nash
equilibrium strategy ω∗u, and for all alternative strategies (ωu,ω∗−u), respectively.
4.2. The SPNE of the two-stage game
The SPNE of the two-stage game is an outcome where no producer can increase its
total profit both in the day-ahead market stage and in the re-dispatch stage by changing
its bidding strategy unilaterally. This is modeled in inequality (17).
piu(s
∗
u, s
∗
−u) + φu(s
∗
u, ω
∗
u, s
∗
−u, ω
∗
−u) ≥ piu(su, s∗−u) + φu(su, ωu, s∗−u, ω∗−u), ∀u (17)
In equality (17), piu(s
∗
u,s
∗−u) and piu(su,s∗−u) represent the profit in the day-ahead
market stage in SPNE strategy (s∗u) and in the alternative strategy (su), respectively.
The profits in the re-dispatch stage in SPNE strategy (s∗u,ω∗u) and in alternative strategy
(su,ωu) are represented in φu(s
∗
u,ω
∗
u,s
∗−u,ω∗−u) and φu(su,ωu,s∗−u,ω∗−u), respectively.
The profit of producer u in the day-ahead market stage is formulated in (18).
piu = (
∑
z:u
δz − Cu)gu (18)
Here δz is the zonal price in the day-ahead market stage. The price and the dispatch
of the producers in the day-ahead market stage is determined by an economic dispatch
model. It is formulated in (19).
Minimize
gu
∑
u
cˆugu (19a)
Subject to:∑
u
gu =
∑
n
Dn : (ξ) (19b)
F¯l −
∑
z
H ′l,z(
∑
z,u
(gu)−
∑
z:n
(Dn)) ≥ 0 : (γl) ∀l (19c)
0 ≤ gu ≤ Gu : (ηu, νu) ∀u (19d)
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Objective function (19a) minimizes the dispatch cost in the day-ahead market stage
while satisfying the energy balance constraint (19b), the available transmission capacity
limits between zones (19c) and the generation limits (19d). In (19c), H ′l,z is the zonal
PTDF for zonal pricing with ATC. Problem (19) is a LP, so therefore its KKT conditions
are necessary and sufficient. The stationary, the dual feasibility and the strong duality
condition of (19) are set out in (20a),(20b) and (20c), respectively.
− cˆu + ξ −
∑
u:z
(
∑
l
H ′l,zγl) + ηu − νu = 0, ∀u (20a)
γl, ηu, νu ≥ 0 (20b)
−
∑
u
cˆugu − (−ξ
∑
n
Dn +
∑
l
γl(F¯l −
∑
z
H ′l,z(
∑
z:n
−Dn))
+
∑
u
νuGu = 0 (20c)
The zonal price in zone z in the day-ahead market stage is calculated by δz =
ξ−∑lH ′l,zγl. Using this expression, stationary condition (20a) and the complementary
slackness conditions for (19d), the day-ahead profit in (21) is reformulated in (21).
piu = (cˆu − Cu)gu + νuGu, ∀u (21)
Similar to the regulation bids in the re-dispatch stage, the day-ahead bids are ap-
proximated by a set of discrete values. This is modeled by binary variables xu,a in
(22).
cˆu =
∑
a
Baxu,aCu (22)
Now, we can formulate the strategic bidding problem of producer u in both day-
ahead market and re-dispatch stages in (23).
Maximize
Θ
piu + φu (23a)
Subject to:
Constraints (16), (19b)− (19d), (20), (21), (22) (23b)
The set of decision variables in (23) is Θ={gu, ξ, γl, ηu, νu, piu, xu,a}. Bilinear term
xu,agu appears in (20c) and (21). It is linearized by McCormick reformulation. Since
day-ahead dispatch decision (gu) is a variable in maximization problem (23), we have
three bilinear terms. These are (a) µk
∑
nHk,n(
∑
n:u gu) in (13d), (b) βugu in (13d)
and (c) ϕugu in (13d). To linearize these bilinear terms, we use the lemma proposed
in [25]. This lemma states that since day-ahead bids are selected from a finite set
of discrete values, the corresponding dispatch, gu, is also selected from a finite set of
discrete values. Accordingly, gu is a discrete variable which can be formulated by binary
variables yu,r in (24).
gu =
∑
r
Eu,ryu,r, ∀u (24)
13
Here parameter Eu,r is the day-ahead dispatch of producer u in bid combination r.
If the number of the producers in the day-ahead market stage is U and each of them
has A bid alternatives, then there can be AU different bid combinations. Here we define
index r which is r = 1, ...,AU . Parameter Eu,r is calculated by solving problem (19)
for all AU bid combinations. The problem (19) in each bid combination is independent
from each other so the calculation of parameter Eu,r can be done in parallel.
This approach transforms the bilinear terms in (a)-(c) to the product of a binary
variable and a continuous variable. They are linearized by McCormick reformulation
as explained before. The resulting model which represents the bidding problem of a
producer in both stages is a MILP. Since each producer chooses its bid from a discrete
set, we can transform each producer’s bidding problem into a MILC model. The solution
of all producers’ two-stage bidding problem simultaneously gives us the SPNE of the
two-game. Our model may have multiple SPNE. To tackle this situation, we employ the
worst SPNE (WSPNE) concept where we find the SPNE which has the worst (highest)
total dispatch cost in two stages. The WSPNE is formulated in (25).
Maximize
Θˆ
∑
u
cˆugu + cˆ
up
u g
up
u − cˆdnu gdnu (25a)
Subject to:
SPNE Constraint (17) (25b)
For SPNE strategy (s∗u, ω
∗
u), ∀u :{
Constraints (16), (19b)− (19d), (20), (21), (22), (24)
}
(25c)
For all alternative strategies (su, s
∗
−u, ωu, ω
∗
−u), ∀u :{
Constraints (16), (19b)− (19d), (20), (21), (22), (24)
}
(25d)
The set of decision variables in (25) is Θˆ=Θ˜∪ Θ˜(su, s∗−u, ωu, ω∗−u) where Θ˜=Θ∪
{yu,r}. Constraints (25c) and (25d) are written for SPNE strategy (s∗u, ω∗u), and for all
alternative strategies (su, s
∗−u, ωu, ω∗−u), respectively.
5. Imperfect Competition under Zonal Pricing with FBMC
Similar to the zonal pricing with ATC, the zonal pricing with FBMC is also employed
in two stages. The first stage is the day-ahead market stage and the second stage is
the re-dispatch stage. In the day-ahead market stage, the market operator considers
a better representation of the transmission system in the market clearing mechanism.
This reduces the overloading in the intra-zonal transmission lines but it may not avoid
it entirely. Hence, a re-dispatch may still be required after the day-ahead market stage
is cleared.
Before the producers submit their bids to the day-ahead market, the market opera-
tor forecasts the cross-border trades and it announces the critical branches (CBs) and
their corresponding Remaining Available Margins (RAMs). Accordingly, the producers
play the two-stage game as for zonal markets with ATC. The CBs and their RAMs are
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calculated using the market operator’s historical data. In this study, we decide CBs and
the related parameters in three steps.
Step 1: Estimation of Generation Shift Keys (GSKs)
GSKs are important parameters when calculating power transfer distribution factors
(PTDFs) for the market. The GSKs indicate the contribution of 1 MWh injection from
node n to the balance in zone z. In practice, the GSKs are calculated by considering a
base case which is derived from a snapshot of the power system showing the injections,
the power flows in the transmission network and the changes in the network topology
[40]. This procedure is not documented for the public. In this study we calculate the
GSKs, Rn,z, by nodal injections divided by zonal net injections as in [24] and [40]. This
is formulated in (26).
Rn,z =
∑
n:u g
∗
u −Dn∑
n:z((
∑
n:u gu)−Dn)
(26)
Here
∑
n:u g
∗
u is the production of producer u which is located at node n. To find the
production level of producer u, the nodal economic dispatch model in (3) is performed.
Since our model has no uncertainty, we assume that the same outcome has been re-
peated for several years. Accordingly, the market operator has a historical data of all
producers’ day-ahead bids under zonal pricing with FBMC. The market operator con-
siders these historical data of the bids while solving the nodal economic dispatch model
in (3). The GSKs cannot be determined in case of balanced zones since denominator∑
n:z((
∑
n:u gu)−Dn) becomes zero.
Step 2: Calculation of Zonal PTDF
After the estimation of GSKs, the zonal PTDF is calculated by means of GSK and the
nodal PTDF. It is formulated in (27).
Hˆk,z =
∑
n
Hk,nRn,z (27)
The zonal PTDF matrix, Hˆk,z, indicates the power flow in line k when 1 MWh is
injected from zone z.
Step 3: Decision of CBs and RAMs
The CBs are the transmission lines which are impacted by the cross-border trades
[41]. Therefore they are considered in the economic dispatch problem in the day-ahead
market stage of the zonal pricing with FBMC. The lines are decided as CBs if their
zone-to-zone PTDF is larger than a certain threshold [42]. The zone-to-zone PTDF,
Tz, is calculated as in (28).
Tk =
∑
z,z 6=z′
|Hˆk,z − Hˆk,z′ | (28)
The RAM is the transmission capacity of the CB which is used in the day-ahead
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market stage of the zonal pricing with FBMC. In practice, the market operator does not
assign the whole physical transmission capacity of a line for the day-ahead market stage.
Instead, it saves some capacity to ensure the secure operation of the power system if an
outage occurs. In this study, we do not model any outage in the power system. Accord-
ingly, we assume that the market operator assigns all physical transmission capacity
RAM of the corresponding transmission line. However, our assumption can be easily
adjusted to model the practice.
Stage 1:
Day-ahead 
market stage
Stage 2:
Re-dispatching 
stage
time
Market operator 
announces the 
CBs and RAMs
The market operator clears 
the day-ahead market and 
announces the day-ahead 
dispatch and zonal prices
The market operator dispatches 
the regulation bids to relieve 
the overloadings induced by the 
day-ahead dispatch
The producers 
submit their day-
ahead bids to the 
market operator
The producers 
submit their 
regulation bids to 
the market operator
Figure 4: The timing of information exchanges under zonal pricing with FBMC
Before the first stage, the market operator calculates and announces the CBs and
RAMs. The information exchange is illustrated in Fig. 4. In the first stage, the
producers consider the announced information, its rivals’ (predicted) day-ahead bid and
the Nash equilibrium in the re-dispatch stage. The market operator receives the day-
ahead bids from all producers and clears the day-ahead market. Then, the producers
are informed by their dispatch level and the market price. In the second stage, each
producer considers the day-ahead dispatch and its rivals’ (predicted) regulation bids
to decide its regulation bids. The market operator receives the regulation bids from
all producers and it dispatches the regulation bids in order to relieve the overloading
induced by the day-ahead dispatch.
The two-stage game and its mathematical model is rather similar to section 4. The
model of the Nash equilibrium in the re-dispatch stage is exactly the same. The only
difference is the model of the transmission constraints in the day-ahead market stage.
In economic dispatch problem (19), we replace (19c) by (29). In (29), I is the set of
selected CBs.
Fk −
∑
z
Hˆk,z(
∑
z:n
gu −
∑
z:n
Dn) ≥ 0 : (γˆk) ∀k ∈ I (29)
The economic dispatch model in the day-ahead market stage of zonal pricing with
FBMC becomes (19a),(19b),(29) and (19d). We write the KKT conditions of the re-
sulting model and its stationary, the dual feasibility and the strong duality condition
are set out in (30a),(30b) and (30c), respectively.
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− cˆu + ξ −
∑
u:z
(
∑
k∈I
Hˆk,zγˆk) + ηu − νu = 0, ∀u (30a)
γˆk∈I , ηu, νu ≥ 0 (30b)
−
∑
u
cˆugu − (ξ
∑
n
Dn +
∑
k∈I
γˆk(Fk −
∑
z
Hˆk,z(
∑
n:z
−Dn))
+
∑
u
νuGu = 0 (30c)
In (31), we formulate the WSPNE model of the two-stage game under zonal pricing
with FBMC.
Maximize
Λˆ
∑
u
cˆugu + cˆ
up
u g
up
u − cˆdnu gdnu (31a)
Subject to:
SPNE Constraint (17) (31b)
For SPNE strategy (s∗u, ω
∗
u), ∀u :{
Constraints (16), (19b), (19d), (21), (22), (24), (29), (30)
}
(31c)
For all alternative strategies (su, s
∗
−u, ωu, ω
∗
−u), ∀u :{
Constraints (16), (19b), (19d), (21), (22), (24), (29), (30)
}
(31d)
The set of decision variables in (31) is Λˆ =Λ∪Λ(su, s∗−u, ωu, ω∗−u) where Λ = Θ˜ ∪
{γˆk} \ {γl}. Constraints (31c) and (31d) are written for SPNE strategy (s∗u, ω∗u), and
for all alternative strategies (su, s
∗−u, ωu, ω∗−u), respectively.
6. Numerical Results
This section demonstrates the bidding behaviors of producers for the market designs
that we consider. To have a congested network and to observe an inc-dec game, we
modified the 6-node system in [43] and IEEE 24-node system in [44]. We decide on these
modifications by running several computational experiments on the example systems.
We use the 6-node system to show how the parameters for the zonal pricing with FBMC
are calculated and to show the inc-dec game and its impacts on an example system. The
applicability of proposed models into a large power system is shown for the modified
IEEE 24-node system. The MILP models (9), (25) and (31) are solved by the CPLEX
solver of the GAMS platform. In order to reduce the solution time, the GUSS facility
of GAMS is used for calculating Eu,r before solving MILP models (25) and (31).
6.1. 6-node example system
The single line diagram of 6-node system is illustrated in Fig. 5.
The 6-node system has three competing generators which are located at nodes 1, 2
and 4. In order to observe inc-dec game, the cost data in [43] are modified. The data
related to the generators are presented in Table 2. The system has two zones and the
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Figure 5: Single line diagram of 6-node example system
ATC between two zones is set to 90% of the total transmission capacity of line k4 and
k5. To have a zonal system with different zonal prices, the transmission capacities of
lines are set to [Fk1 ,Fk2 ,Fk3 ,Fk4 ,Fk5 ,Fk6 ,Fk7 ,Fk8 ]=[70,150,100,200,250,250,180,100] MW.
We assume that each transmission line has an impedance of 1 per-unit. Each producer
has three bidding actions for day-ahead price bids with 0%, 10% mark-up and 10%
mark-down. The permissible up-regulation and down-regulation bids have 0%, 10%,
20% mark-up and 0%, 10%, 20% mark-down, respectively.
Table 2: Producer data in the 6-node system
u Cu C
up
u Cdnu Gu Load Dn
($/MWh) ($/MWh) ($/MWh) (MW) (MWh)
u1 16.5 20.5 12 500 n2 300
u2 14.9 19 11.5 400 n5 300
u3 16 19.5 12.5 400 n6 300
The details of deciding the CBs and calculation of FBMC parameters for the 6-node
system can be found in Appendix A. The lines k4 and k5 are found as the CBs for
the zonal pricing with FBMC. We simulate all three congestion management methods.
There are typically multiple equilibria. We report the worst-dispatch-cost equilibrium
for each congestion management method, i.e. the WNE of the one-stage game related
to nodal pricing and the WSPNE of the two-stage games related to zonal pricing with
ATC and zonal pricing with FBMC. These equilibria are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: The worst-cost equilibrium in each congestion management method
NP ZP with ATC ZP with FBMC
cˆu cˆu cˆ
up
u cˆdnu cˆu cˆ
up
u cˆdnu
($/MWh) ($/MWh) ($/MWh) ($/MWh) ($/MWh) ($/MWh) ($/MWh)
u1 18.15 14.85 24.6 9.6 18.15 24.6 9.6
u2 16.39 16.39 22.8 9.2 13.41 22.8 9.2
u3 17.6 17.6 23.4 10 14.4 23.4 10
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For nodal pricing, all producers choose price bids which are higher than their
marginal costs. In the zonal pricing with ATC, export-constrained producer, u1, plays
inc-dec game by choosing a day-ahead bid which is lower than its marginal cost. Pro-
ducers u2 and u3 choose their day-ahead bids which are higher than their marginal costs,
which is similar to the nodal market. The market operator dispatches producers u1 at
500 MW, u2 at 205 MW and u3 at 195 MW. This day-ahead dispatch causes overloading
in line k1, between node 1 and 2, by 103.5 MW. The market operator dispatches the
down-regulation bid of u1 at 177.5 MW and up-regulation bid of u2 at 177.5 MW to
relieve this overloading.
In the zonal pricing with FBMC, producers u2 and u3 choose day-ahead bids which
are lower than their marginal costs and producer u1 chooses a price bid which is higher
than its marginal cost. In this SPNE, producer u3 decides its day-ahead bid in order
to play inc-dec game. Producer u2 bids a sufficiently low price to ensure that u1 does
not find it more profitable to deviate and undercut. Hence, setting a high price, 18.15
$/MWh, is the most profitable strategy for producer u1. This is related to the high-
price equilibrium [45]. In the day-ahead market stage, producers u1, u2 and u3 are
dispatched 100 MWh, 400 MWh and 400 MWh, respectively. We observe that the
day-ahead dispatch overloads the line between node 4 and node 6, line k7, by 20 MW.
Note that line k7 is not a CB. The market operator dispatches down-regulation bid of
u3 and up-regulation bid of u1 in order to relieve the overloading. We see that producer
u3 plays the inc-dec game and the choice of its day-ahead bid overloads line k7. The
critical branches, k4 and k5, are not congested and the zonal price in both zones are set
by producer u1’s bid, 18.15 $/MWh. The dispatch and the profits of each producer is
summarized in Table 4.
Table 4: The dispatch and the profits of each producer in each congestion management method
NP ZP with ATC ZP with FBMC
gu piu gu g
up
u gdnu piu φu gu g
up
u gdnu piu φu
u1 138.4 228.3 500 0 177.5 -55 425.9 100 38.4 0 165 157.3
u2 400 1282.4 205 177.5 0 305.5 674.4 400 0 0 1300 0
u3 361.6 578.6 195 0 0 674.4 0 400 0 38.4 860 95.9
Table 4 shows that under zonal pricing with ATC, producer u1 makes a 55 $/h loss
in the day-ahead market stage and it makes a 425.9 $/h profit in the re-dispatch stage.
Table 5 illustrates the volume of overloading, the total production cost in both
stages, the total profit and the net-expenses of the market operator. The total produc-
tion cost is calculated by summing the production cost in the day-ahead stage,
∑
uCugu,
and the production cost in the re-dispatch stage,
∑
uC
up
u g
up
u −Cdnu gdnu . We observe that
zonal pricing with ATC has the highest overloading due to the inc-dec game. Hence, it
has the highest total production cost. Zonal pricing with FBMC reduces the volume of
overloading by 81%. Accordingly, the inc-dec game is reduced as well. The total pro-
duction cost in the FBMC approach is 8.6% lower than the one in the ATC approach. In
this example system, nodal pricing becomes the most efficient congestion management
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method since it has no overloading after the dispatch of the day-ahead market stage.
Accordingly, it has the lowest total production cost. The total profit of the producers is
the highest in the zonal pricing with FBMC. We observe that under zonal pricing with
FBMC, no congestion occurs in the day-ahead market stage, accordingly all producers
are paid by the same price which is set by the most expensive producer (producer u1).
In both zonal designs, the market operator has positive net-expenses (losses) due to
the inc-dec game. However, under nodal pricing the market operator makes a profit of
190.1$/h.
Table 5: Production cost, total profit, and total payments in each congestion management methods,
DAMS: Day-ahead market stage, RS: Re-dispatch stage
NP ZP with ATC ZP with FBMC
Volume of overloading (MW) 0 103.5 20
Total production
14029.2 15666.8 14316.9
cost ($/h) aO
Total profit ($/h) bO 2089.3 1662.8 2578.2
Total load
16308.6 15477 16335
payments ($/h) cO
Net-expenses of market
-190.1 1852.6 560.1
operator ($/h) aO+ bO- cO
In Table 2, we assume that changing the production of the producers in the real-
time operation is more expensive than their marginal cost i.e. last minute ramping is
costly. Hence, the marginal cost of up-regulation of each producer, Cupu , is set higher
than its marginal cost, Cu and the marginal cost of down-regulation of each producer,
Cdnu , is set lower than its marginal cost. We observe that the ramping costs has an
important influence on the market efficiency. To further investigate this issue, we set
Cu = C
up
u = Cdnu and simulate the 6-node system. All other parameters are kept the
same. Since nodal pricing does not have the re-dispach stage, we only simulate zonal
pricing with ATC and zonal pricing with FBMC. The WSPNE and the dispatch levels in
two stages are the same as in Table 3 and 4 in both zonal designs. The total production
cost is calculated by 14140.5$/h for zonal pricing with ATC and 14029.2$/h for zonal
pricing with FBMC. We see that the ramping cost has a substantial impact on the total
production cost. One other interesting observation is that without ramping costs, zonal
pricing with FBMC is as efficient as nodal pricing.
6.2. Modified IEEE 24-node example system
The single line diagram of the IEEE 24-node system is illustrated in Fig 6.
To observe congestions in the network and an inc-dec game, we consider five pro-
ducers with large installed capacities. The data related to the producers are presented
in Table 6.
We split the IEEE 24-node system into 3 zones and the ATCs between zones are
set to 90% of the total transmission capacity of the inter-zonal lines. To ensure that a
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Figure 6: Single line diagram of the modified IEEE 24-node example system
Table 6: Producer data in the modified IEEE 24-node system
u Location Cu C
up
u Cdnu Gu
(Node) ($/MWh) ($/MWh) ($/MWh) (MW)
u1 1 17.5 25.5 14 1000
u2 2 18 23.5 13.5 800
u3 13 17 22.5 11.5 1000
u4 21 16 20.5 10.5 1000
u5 22 16.7 21.5 11 1700
feasible dispatch can be found for every bid combination for every congestion manage-
ment method, the transmission capacities of lines between nodes 1-5, 16-17 and 16-19
are changed from the values in [44] to 350 MW, 800 MW and 800 MW, respectively.
We assume that each producer has 3 bidding actions for day-ahead price bids: 0%, 10%
mark-up and 10% mark-down. The permissible up-regulation and down-regulation bids
have 0%, 10%, 20% mark-up and 0%, 10%, 20% mark-down, respectively.
We follow the steps explained in Section 5 and demonstrated on the modified IEEE
24-node network to find the CBs. We find 13 transmission lines as the CBs.
Table 7 illustrates the worst-cost equilibria (WNE in one-stage game and WSPNE
in two-stage game) for each congestion management method. Under nodal pricing, all
producers choose price bids higher than their marginal costs. Under zonal pricing with
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Table 7: The worst-cost equilibrium in each congestion management method
NP ZP with ATC ZP with FBMC
cˆu cˆu cˆ
up
u cˆdnu cˆu cˆ
up
u cˆdnu
($/MWh) ($/MWh) ($/MWh) ($/MWh) ($/MWh) ($/MWh) ($/MWh)
u1 19.25 15.75 30.6 11.2 19.25 30.6 11.2
u2 19.8 19.8 28.2 10.8 19.8 28.2 10.8
u3 18.7 18.7 27 9.2 15.3 27 9.2
u4 17.6 17.6 24.6 8.4 14.4 24.6 8.4
u5 18.37 15.03 25.8 8.8 18.37 25.8 8.8
ATC, producers u1 and u5 play the inc-dec game by choosing day-ahead bids which are
lower than their marginal costs. The market operator dispatches u1 at 1000 MW, u4 at
145 and u5 at 1700 MW. This day-ahead dispatch overloads the line between nodes 1
and 2 and the line between nodes 21 and 22 by 294.7 MW and 501.9 MW, respectively.
The market operator dispatches the down-regulation bids of u1 at 216.6 MW and u5
at 790.9 MW and the up-regulation bids of u2 at 387.3 MW and u4 at 620.2 MW to
relieve the overloadings. In the zonal pricing with FBMC, producers u3 and u4 choose
day-ahead bids which are lower than their marginal costs and producers u1, u2 and
u5 choose day-ahead bids which are higher than their marginal cost. In the day-ahead
market stage, producers u1, u3 and u4 are dispatched 795 MWh, 1000 MWh and 1050
MWh, respectively. We observe that the day-ahead dispatch overloads the line between
nodes 1 and 2 by 184.7 MW. The market operator dispatch down-regulation bid of u1 at
195.8 MW and up-regulation bid of u2 at 195.8 MW in order to relieve the overloading.
The dispatch and the profits of each producer are summarized in Table 8.
Table 8: The dispatch and the profits of each producer for each congestion management method
NP ZP with ATC ZP with FBMC
gu piu gu g
up
u gdnu piu φu gu g
up
u gdnu piu φu
u1 58 101.5 1000 0 216.6 100 606.4 795 0 195.8 1391.3 548.3
u2 0 0 0 387.3 0 0 1820.2 0 195.8 0 0 920.3
u3 807 1372.6 0 0 0 0 0 1000 0 0 2250 0
u4 1050 2872.9 145 620.2 0 232 2542.7 1050 0 0 3412.5 0
u5 930 1552.6 1700 0 790.9 1530 1739.9 0 0 0 0 0
Table 9 shows that the zonal pricing with FBMC, which uses a better representation
of the transmission system in the day-ahead market stage, reduces the total volume of
overloading by 76.8% as compared to the zonal pricing with ATC. We observe that the
zonal pricing with ATC has the highest total cost due to the inc-dec game. Zonal pricing
with FBMC reduces the inc-dec game, accordingly the total production cost reduces by
14.9% as compared to zonal pricing with ATC. Table 9 shows that the nodal pricing
is the most efficient congestion management method also for this example system. It
has a total production cost which is 23.9% and 5.3% lower than the one in ATC and
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FBMC approaches, respectively. The producers’ total profit is the highest in the zonal
pricing with ATC due to the inc-dec game. The market operator makes losses in both
zonal pricing designs due to the inc-dec game. However under nodal pricing, it makes
an profit of 906.1 $/h.
Table 9: Production cost, total profit, and total payments in each congestion management methods,
DAMS: Day-ahead market stage, RS: Re-dispatch stage
NP ZP with ATC ZP with FBMC
Volume of overloading (MW) 0 796.6 184.7
Total production
47065 58292.7 49572.6
cost ($/h) aO
Total profit ($/h) bO 5899.4 8571.1 8522.3
Total load
53871 50072 54766.3
payments ($/h) cO
Net-expenses of market
-906.1 16791.8 3328.6
operator ($/h) aO+ bO- cO
Our numerical results show that under zonal pricing with ATC, producers which
are located at the export-constrained nodes, u1 in 6-node system and u1 and u5 in
the modified IEEE 24-node system, plays the inc-dec game. This causes production
inefficiencies. Zonal pricing with ATC has 10.5-18.7% higher total production cost the
one under nodal pricing. Zonal pricing with FBMC represents the transmission network
better than zonal pricing with ATC and this causes a reduction in the inc-dec game
and an increase in the production efficiency by 8.6-14.9%. Since zonal pricing with
FBMC cannot avoid the inc-dec game, it is 2-5.3% less efficient than the nodal pricing
benchmark.
As in the 6-node system, we set Cu = C
up
u = Cdnu and simulate the modified IEEE
24-node system. All other parameters are kept the same. For the found equilibria, we
calculate the total production cost for zonal pricing with ATC and zonal pricing with
FBMC by 48191.8$/h and by 47810.4$/h, respectively. Similar to the results in the
6-node system, the ramping costs has a large impact on the total production in the
modified IEEE 24-node system.
7. Conclusion
This paper analyzes imperfect competition in electricity markets under nodal and
zonal pricing. We consider two types of zonal pricing: zonal pricing with ATC and zonal
pricing with FBMC. The imperfect competition under nodal pricing is modeled as a one-
stage game. The zonal pricing consists of two stages: the day-ahead market stage and
the re-dispatch stage. We consider a two-stage game to model imperfect competition
in these two stages. Mathematically, we formulate the two-stage game related to each
type of zonal pricing as a two-stage EPEC and then it is reformulated as a two-stage
MILP model. To tackle multiple equilibria, we use the concept of the worst-dispatch-
cost equilibrium and consider the equilibrium which has the highest total dispatch cost.
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The developed MILP models are demonstrated using the 6-node and the modified IEEE
24-node example systems.
Our numerical results show that the inc-dec game in zonal pricing with ATC can have
large production inefficiencies and large profits for producers especially if ramping costs
are high. The zonal pricing with FBMC has a better representation of the transmission
system in the day-ahead market stage and it reduces inc-dec game but it cannot avoid
it. Accordingly, it is less efficient than nodal pricing.
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Appendix A. Demonstration of the calculation of the FBMC parameters in
the 6-node system
We first illustrate how the CBs are selected by the market operator. The nodal
PTDF matrix is calculated as in [37] and it is illustrated in Table A.10.
Table A.10: Nodal PTDF matrix
n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6
k1 0.25 -0.333 0.042 -0.042 -0.083 0
k2 0.125 -0.167 -0.521 -0.021 -0.042 0
k3 -0.125 0.167 -0.479 0.021 0.042 0
k4 0.375 0.5 0.438 -0.063 -0.125 0
k5 0.625 0.5 0.563 0.063 0.125 0
k6 -0.125 -0.167 -0.146 0.354 -0.292 0
k7 0.125 0.167 0.146 0.646 0.292 0
k8 0.25 0.333 0.292 0.292 0.583 0
The market operator considers the day-ahead bids as cˆu1=18.15 $/MWh, cˆu2=13.41
$/MWh, and cˆu3=14.4 $/MWh. Given these bids, the nodal net injection at each node
is calculated by solving optimization problem (3). Accordingly, GSKs are calculated by
expression (26) and they are illustrated in Table A.11.
Table A.11: Generation shift keys
n1 n2 n4 n5 n6
z1 0.779 0.221
z2 -0.395 -0.698 -0.698
Using GSKs and the nodal PTDF matrix, the zonal PTDF matrix is calculated by
expression (27) and it is illustrated in Table A.12.
Table A.12: Zonal PTDF matrix
k1 k2 k3 k4 k5 k6 k7 k8
z1 0.121 0.061 -0.061 0.403 0.597 -0.134 0.134 0.268
z2 -0.042 -0.021 0.021 -0.062 0.062 -0.344 -0.052 0.292
The zone-to-zone PTDF matrix is calculated by expression (28) and it is illustrated
in Table A.13.
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Table A.13: Zone-to-zone PTDF matrix
k1 k2 k3 k4 k5 k6 k7 k8
Tk 0.163 0.082 0.082 0.465 0.535 0.21 0.186 0.024
We set the threshold to 0.4 when selecting the CBs in the zone-to-zone PTDF matrix.
Accordingly, lines k4 and k5 are selected as CBs.
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Appendix B. Nomenclature
The list of the notation is presented below.
Indices
u Producer, u = 1, ...,U
n Power system node, n = 1, ...,N
z,z′ Zone, z = 1, ...,Z
k Transmission line, k = 1, ...,K
l Inter-zonal line, l = 1, ...,L
s Bidding strategy in the day-ahead stage, s = 1, ...,S
ω Bidding strategy in the re-dispatch stage, ω = 1, ...,Ω
a Bidding action of generator, a = 0, ...,A
r Day-ahead bid combination, r = 1, ...,AU
Set
J Set of transmission lines
I Set of critical branches, I ⊂ J
Parameters (upper-case letters)
Gu Installed capacity of producer u,
Cu Marginal cost of producer u,
Cupu Marginal up-regulation cost of producer u,
Cdnu Marginal down-regulation cost of producer u,
Cu,Cu, Upper (lower) limit of day-ahead bid of producer u,
C
up
u ,C
up
u , Upper (lower) limit of up-regulation bid of producer u,
C
dn
u ,C
dn
u , Upper (lower) limit of down-regulation bid of producer u,
Hk,n Nodal PTDF matrix,
H ′l,z Zonal PTDF matrix for zonal pricing with ATC,
Hˆk,z Zonal PTDF matrix for zonal pricing with FBMC,
Fk Capacity of transmission line k,
F¯l Available transmission capacity of inter-zonal line l,
Eu,r Day-ahead dispatch of producer u in day-ahead bid
combination r,
Dn Demand at node n,
Ba Step size of bidding action a,
Rn,z Generation shift keys matrix,
Tk Zone-to-zone PTDF matrix,
Variables (lower-case letters)
gu Day-ahead dispatch of producer u,
gupu , (gdnu ) Up (down) regulation provided by producer u
yu,r Binary variable for modeling day-ahead dispatch of
producer u in bid combination r,
xu Binary variable of day-ahead bidding decision of
producer u,
xupu , (xdnu ) Binary variable for up-regulation (down-regulation)
bidding decision of producer u,
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cˆu Price bid of unit u,
cˆupu , (cˆdnu ) Up-regulation (down-regulation) price bid of unit u
λn Day-ahead market price at node n,
δz Day-ahead zonal price at zone z,
φu Profit of producer u in re-dispatch stage,
piu Day-ahead profit of producer u.
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